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1st Interdisciplinary Workshop on Smart Grid Design & Implementation

The Future Grid: Tradeoffs in Competition Versus Cooperation
Mardavij Roozbehani
Mardavij Roozbehani is a principal research scientist at the Laboratory for Information and Decision systems (LIDS). He received the Ph.D. degree in Aeronautics and Astronautics from MIT (2008), focusing on developing a control theoretic framework for verification of software systems. Between 2008 and 2011 he held postdoctoral and research scientist positions at LIDS. His main research interests include distributed and networked control systems, software and finite-state systems, and dynamics and economics of power systems with an emphasis on robustness and risk. Dr. Roozbehani is a recipient of the 2007 AIAA graduate award for safety verification of real-time software systems.
Abstract: 
The future grid is characterized by an increase in the number of distributed agents, either as generators or consumers or both, that actively respond to the grid conditions and the market signals. The architecture of the grid, and the associated policies determine whether these agents cooperate, i.e., form coalitions to maximize their aggregate utility, or not cooperate, i.e., behave strategically to maximize their individual utilities. In this talk, we show how tradeoffs between efficiency and risk arise from different architectures. We consider a market in which there is a reliable resource provider and agents that enter and exit the market following a random process. Self-interested and fully rational agents dynamically update their resource consumption decisions over a finite time horizon, under the constraint that the total resource consumption requirements are met before each individual’s deadline. We then compare the statistics of the stationary aggregate demand processes induced by the non-cooperative and cooperative architectures. We show that although the non-cooperative load scheduling scheme leads to an efficiency loss the stationary distribution of the corresponding aggregate demand process has a smaller tail. On the other hand, when the agents can cooperate with each other in optimizing their total cost, a higher market efficiency is achieved at the cost of a higher probability of demand spikes, which we associate with higher risk. Finally, we discus how risk may emerge in the future grid when several agents, e.g., a conventional generator, a storage, and a wind producer form a coalition known as a virtual power plant (VPP) to supply more reliable power in the market.
Date: 
Friday, December 7th 2012
Time: 
10:00am
Room: 
201 NEB

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